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 I.  Introduction 
 
The first of the eight Millennium Development Goals articulated at the UN 
General Assembly in 2000 was to halve by 2015 the proportion of people in absolute 
poverty, that is, those living on less than US$1 per day and suffering from hunger. 
Throughout most of the 19
th and 20
th centuries, the number of people in the world that 
were poverty stricken to that extent had been increasing almost continually 
(Bouguignon and Morrisson 2002). Since the late 1970s, however, the number has 
declined by more than 200 million (Sala-i-Martin 2002). Remarkable though that 
recent achievement has been in such a short period, the World Bank estimates that 
there were still as many as one in five people, or 1.2 billion, below that poverty line in 
2000 (e.g., Collier and Dollar 2002, Figure 3).
1  
Efforts to alleviate poverty for those remaining poor people, if they are to be 
successful, need to be based on a clear understanding of the reasons behind successful 
alleviation to date. The evidence presented by Sala-i-Martin suggests aggregate 
economic growth differences have been largely responsible for the differences in 
poverty alleviation across regions, a finding supported by numerous other studies 
(e.g., Dollar and Kraay 2002). Initiatives that boost economic growth are therefore 
likely to be helpful in the fight against absolute poverty.  
Trade liberalization is such an initiative that tends to boost economic growth.
2 
But it also alters relative product prices, so its net effect on poverty reduction depends 
also on the signs of those product price changes and how they affect factor prices and 
household incomes. If the price changes (whether due to own reforms and/or those of 
other countries) are pro-poor, then they will tend to reinforce any positive growth 
effects of trade reform on the poor, although the outcome depends also on the extent 
to which complementary changes in policies abroad or at home: 
•  create new markets that are pro-poor; 
•  stimulate the poor to respond to altered prices and new market opportunities; 
•  provide second-round spillover effects that are pro-poor; 
                                                 
1 Sala-i-Martin’s data suggest the number has fallen to 350 million, at least in 1985 PPP terms. Even if 
that lower figure were to be correct, it is an unacceptable number of people in extreme poverty. 
2 The link between openness and economic growth, while not completely unambiguous and universal, 
is strong, and there is no evidence that openness is harmful to growth (see the discussion in McCulloch, 
Winters and Cirera 2001, Ch. 2). Trade’s impact on growth can be much reduced in the absence of 
liberal domestic markets, macro stability, and appropriate institutions and infrastructure, however, 
since those are all necessary to enable producers to respond to changes in international market signals 
(Hoekman et al. 2002). For a comprehensive survey of the links between trade, growth and poverty, see 
Berg and Krueger (2002). The theory is also covered succinctly in Winters (2002) while a survey of the 
empirical evidence is available in Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2002).  2
•  minimize any transitional unemployment that is concentrated on the poor; 
•  raise government revenue that leads to pro-poor public expenditure; and 
•  reduce the vulnerability of the poor. 
The present paper explores the potential poverty implications of one aspect of 
the current Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade 
liberalization agenda. At the WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, members 
agreed, in launching the next comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations 
(MTNs), that there to be a substantial focus on development concerns (see the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration in WTO (2001b)). Even so, numerous developing countries 
remain sceptical that they will receive sufficient gains from that MTN to warrant the 
inevitable costs of negotiations and adjustments.
3 They and the donor community are 
sceptical not least because they perceive the OECD countries as unwilling to provide 
developing countries access to highly protected agricultural (and textile) markets. 
Some of them also still need to be convinced that reducing distortions in world food 
markets would alleviate rather than add to poverty and food insecurity in developing 
countries Those in net food-importing developing economies worry too that, because 
of a higher food import bill, they will be worse off because of agricultural trade 
reform. Yet two-thirds of the world’s poor live in rural areas and, in least-developed 
countries, the proportion is as high as 90 per cent (OECD 2003), so an alternative 
prior is that agricultural trade liberalization would be pro-poor. Given these differing 
priors, the aspect of the WTO negotiations focused on in below is the poverty impact 
reform of agricultural policy reform relative to liberalizing trade in other goods.
4   
This paper begins with a brief history of government intervention in 
agricultural markets, pointing to the historical tendency for countries to gradually 
change from taxing to subsidizing agriculture relative to other tradable sectors as they 
develop. That suggests domestic political economy forces on their own are unlikely to 
deliver permanently liberal food markets. Hence the need for external influences to 
alter that domestic political economy (Anderson 1992). The Uruguay Round 
agreements on agriculture and other sectors had the potential to alter outcomes, but it 
                                                 
3 Their scepticism is supported by recent reviews of the benefits to date to developing countries from 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. See, for example, Mathews (2002). 
4 An additional reason for focusing on agriculture is that – contrary to conventional wisdom –
productivity growth in agriculture historically has outpaced that in manufacturing, including in 
developing countries (Martin and Mitra 2001). That empirical evidence suggests liberalizing markets 
for farm products could provide an above-average boost to economic growth in poor countries, ceteris 
paribus, which would add further to poverty alleviation. In so far as new agricultural technologies tend 
to have a labour-saving bias, however, maximizing the benefits from agricultural productivity growth 
requires flexible labour markets so that displaced farm workers can find employment readily in non-
farm sectors.   3
did little more than establish a framework for reversing that policy transition process. 
For Doha to deliver a more successful outcome, evidently there will need to be more 
political gains to offset the domestic political losses associated with cuts to 
agricultural support programs.  
The paper then reports modelling results suggesting that agricultural trade 
policies remain by far the most costly of all goods market distortions in world trade. 
What also becomes clear from those results is that if developing countries want to 
maximize their benefits from the Doha MTN round, they need also to free up their 
own agricultural and other markets so their producers are better able to take advantage 
of new market-opening opportunities abroad. The paper goes on to address such 
questions as whether some developing countries would be made worse off through 
preference erosion, whether net food-importing developing economies would suffer 
from higher food prices in international markets, and whether Doha would worsen 
food security for the urban poor of developing countries. To help answer that question 
by way of example, the paper examines China’s accession to WTO, which involves 
altering relative prices in China to a much larger extent than the Doha Round is likely 
to do. While the conventional wisdom has been that WTO accession for China will 
exacerbate poverty in that country, the results summarized below offer a somewhat 
more optimistic view, particularly if mooted reforms to domestic policies are 
implemented.  
The paper concludes with suggestions of ways to increase the prospects of a 
pro-poor reform outcome from the Doha Round, including changes needed to the 
domestic and trade policies of developing countries themselves. 
 
 
II.  Need for further reform 
 
A brief history of government intervention in agriculture 
 
  During more than three centuries of modern economic growth there has been 
only one significant episode involving a major liberalization of agricultural 
protectionism, namely the mid-nineteenth century repeal of Britain's Corn Laws. Other 
than that, the history of industrial and post-industrial development has included a 
repeated pattern of agricultural protection growth. Poor agrarian economies tend to tax 
agriculture relative to other tradables sectors, but as nations industrialize – and for 
understandable political economy reasons (Anderson 1995) – their policy regimes tend  4
to gradually change from negatively to positively assisting farmers relative to other 
producers (and from subsidizing to taxing food consumers). The period since the 
1950s has seen substantial growth in agricultural protectionism in the advanced 
industrial economies and its spread to newly industrializing economies, tendencies that 
accelerated in the 1980s (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Anderson 1994; Lindert 1991; 
OECD 2002).  
  Consistent with that theory is the reduction in developing countries’ taxation of 
agriculture since the 1980s, either directly and/or indirectly via reductions in 
manufacturing protection and currency overvaluation (Hensen, Robinson and Tarp 
2002). Such unilateral reforms, while by no means universal, have been more 
widespread and faster than in earlier decades. Learning from the economic policy 
lessons of history may be part of the reason, added to which has been World Bank etc. 
loan conditionality (since removing those agricultural disincentives boosts economic 
welfare and growth). This process can be expected to continue. 
  Once countries cross the line and begin protecting their farmers, however, the 
task of future unilateral liberalization becomes much more difficult politically. A 
possible solution is to open the polity, for example via trade negotiations whereby 
market access can be exchanged to the mutual political benefit of the trading partners’ 
leaders (Grossman and Helpman 1995, Hillman and Moser 1995). 
  Given that history, the attempt in the Uruguay Round to reduce farm price 
supports was seen as both exciting and daunting: exciting, because a successful 
liberalization would reduce the huge and growing waste of resources that would be 
associated with the continuation of past trends in farm policies; and daunting, because 
the history of those policy trends across many countries and over a long period 
suggests major counter-acting of domestic political forces would be needed for a 
multilateral agreement to be reached. 
  It seems almost incredible that the Uruguay Round could have been prolonged 
for years by a farm trade dispute affecting products that account for one-twelth of 
world trade and less than one-twentieth of GDP and employment in the main countries 
seeking exceptional treatment for agriculture. It seems all the more amazing given that 
the economies hurt most by these policies are those of the protecting countries 
themselves. The protectionist policies are wasteful in terms of raising consumer prices 
for food; requiring ever-larger treasury outlays to farmers; redistributing welfare with 
increasing inefficiency (not only because it costs consumers and taxpayers much more 
than one dollar for every dollar received by farmers, but also because the largest  5
producers receive the lion's share of the benefits); making non-agricultural producers 
less competitive in so far as farm programs retain resources in agriculture; and 
damaging the natural environment, not least because these price-support policies 
typically encourage excessive use of farm chemicals (Tyers and Anderson 1992).  
  Why has agreement on farm trade reform been so difficult to reach? The issue 
involves two key groups of countries.
5 On the one hand, there are the traditionally 
lightly protected, food-exporting countries, involving not only the members of the 
Cairns Group
6 but also numerous other developing countries; and on the other hand, 
there are industrial countries of Western Europe, Japan, Korea and a few food-
importing developing countries that are highly protective of some of their farmers. 
Both groups have felt strongly about their positions for a long time. Indeed it is 
because those policies are so contentious that (a) the first four rounds of GATT-based 
multilateral trade negotiations virtually ignored them and the next three eventually had 
to drop them, and (b) many minilateral (regional and other preferential) trade 
agreements also largely exclude farm products. It is therefore not surprising that the 
inclusion of farm policies in the Uruguay Round caused problems. Their inclusion was 
considered necessary, however, because they had become extremely distortionary by 
the 1980s, both absolutely and relative to non-farm trade policies, and because there 
were indications that agricultural protection growth, unless explicitly checked, would 
continue to spread to newly industrializing countries and economies in transition (both 
in China and in Central and Eastern Europe).
7 
  The growth of agricultural protectionism in industrializing countries has 
contributed to the long-term downward trend (0.5 per cent per year during the 20
th 
century) and to the fluctuations in international prices of farm products relative to 
those for industrial products. That, together with the EC's provision from the latter 
                                                 
5 Two other groups of countries referred to below are the net food-importing developing countries, who 
fear farm trade reform will raise their food import bills, and certain low-income countries currently 
enjoying preferential access to developed-country agricultural markets. 
6 The Cairns Group as of early 2003 comprised the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. Originally it involved 14 countries 
excluding Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay and South Africa but including Fiji and Hungary. 
The group is named after the Australian city where it first met in August 1986. The Group's sole 
purpose was to ensure that agricultural trade liberalization remained high on the agenda of the Uruguay 
Round – and that objective has continued just as strongly into the Doha Round.  
7 Note from Figure 2 below that Poland and Hungary have begun to raise their farm producer support 
in anticipation of accession to the EU and its Common Agricultural Policy. In 2000 the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia each had agricultural producer subsidy equivalents 
(PSEs) of around 20 per cent. Unless the EU’s protection is lowered, EU accession by those countries 
would over time involve a doubling of their PSEs. The rise would be even larger for Estonia, Lithuania 
and Romania whose PSEs averaged only one-quarter of the EU-15 average in 2000, and for Bulgaria 
whose PSE is only one-tenth (OECD 2002; Baker 2003).  6
1970s of export subsidies to dispose of its induced surpluses, stimulated the US to 
defend its foreign markets by subsidizing US farm exports as well -- a move that 
contributed to international food prices falling by 1987 to their lowest level fro the 
twentieth century in real terms. The export subsidies under the US Export 
Enhancement Program were very costly to the US, added only very modestly in 
proportional terms to the EC budgetary cost of the Common Agricultural Policy, and 
imposed large costs on other actual or would-be agricultural-exporting countries. As a 
consequence of these policy developments, the deadweight welfare losses in those 
protecting countries from distorting their food markets more than doubled over the 
1980s, while the benefits to their farmers as a group increased by ‘only’ 50 per cent 
(Tyers and Anderson 1992, Tables 6.5, 6.6). To that increase in inefficiency of these 
policies as redistributive devices has to be added the costs of lobbying for and 
administering the policies plus the collection and by-product distortion costs of raising 
the government revenue needed to finance the subsidies. 
 
What cuts in agricultural support resulted from the Uruguay Round? 
   
  Despite the strong emphasis in the Uruguay Round (UR) on agriculture, the 
extent of agricultural protectionism has diminished little. In the OECD countries, the 
total net transfer from consumers and taxpayers to farmers was 2.3 per cent of their 
GDP at the start of the UR (1986-88). By the end of the UR negotiations that had 
fallen to 1.8 per cent (1993-95); and by the end of implementation of commitments by 
those countries those net transfers were just 1.3 per cent of their GDP. That indicator 
is not very relevant, however, because agriculture’s share of GDP has continued to 
diminish over that period. The total value of that transfer has in fact not fallen at all. 
On the contrary, it has risen from 302 to 330 billion US dollars between 1986-88 and 
1999-2001 (OECD 2002).  
Of more relevance is the producer nominal protection coefficient (the ratio of 
prices received by producers and the border price, both adjusted to refer to the same 
point in the marketing chain). That fell between 1986-88 and 1993-95 from 1.57 to 
1.40, but mainly just because international food prices rose from historically low to 
historically high levels while policies ensured that domestic prices changed little. 
Since then that ratio has fallen only slightly, to 1.35 in 1999-01 (OECD 2002). 
Similar changes have been estimated by the OECD for its percentage producer and 
consumer subsidy equivalents (PSEs/CSEs). But with the number of active farmers  7
declining over time, support per farmer has continued to rise in numerous OECD 
countries. Meanwhile, the range of support across OECD countries remains almost as 
wide now as it was fifteen years ago: averaging less than 5 per cent of gross farm 
receipts in Australasia and 20 per cent in North America but 35 per cent in the EU and 
more than 60 per cent in Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland (Figure 1). 
There have been some changes in the ways in which support for farmers is 
provided, but they too have been minor. The key shift – mainly confined to the EU 
and Switzerland – has been away from production- and trade-distorting measures 
towards area payments, payments subject to input constraints, and payments subject 
to an income means test. Even so, market price support still accounted for four-fifths 
of all OECD agricultural support in 1999-2001 (Figure 2). Since then the United 
States has introduced its 2002 Farm Bill which shifted some of its producer support to 
more direct means – at the same time raising overall assistance to farmers, much to 
the chagrin of the Cairns Group and other agricultural exporters. Orden (2003) argues 
that despite that Bill, the US is still capable of offering substantial reductions in 
protection if others are willing to do likewise in the Doha Round. 
 
Where are the biggest potential gains from the Doha Round? 
  
Given those and all the other changes in farm and non-farm protection 
expected by the end of the Uruguay Round implementation period, what is the 
potential for further welfare gains from the WTO’s Doha Development Round? This 
question was addressed in a recent empirical study (Anderson et al. 2001), using an 
applied general equilibrium model of the global economy known as GTAP.
8 
According to that study, of all the economic gains to be had in 2005 from removing 
the barriers to trade in goods that will still be in place after all Uruguay Round 
commitments are implemented, almost half (48 per cent) would come from 
agricultural and processed food policy reform in OECD countries (Table 1) – even 
though such products in those countries contribute only 4 per cent of global GDP. But 
notice also that another one-sixth of the welfare gains would come from reform of 
farm and food policies of developing countries.  
                                                 
8 The GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model is based in Purdue University (see Hertel 1997). It 
is a standard, multi-region model that is currently in use by several hundred researchers in scores of 
countries on five continents. The data base builds on contributions from many of these individuals, as well 
as the national and international agencies in the GTAP Consortium.  8
Textiles and clothing reforms would be the next biggest contributor, although 
they appear small by comparison with agricultural reform: their potential global 
welfare contribution is only one-ninth that of agriculture’s (7 per cent compared with 
65 per cent). This big difference reflects two facts. One is that projected distortions to 
prices for agriculture are more than twice those for textiles and clothing in 2005. The 
other is that textiles and clothing contribute only 1.5 per cent to the value of world 
production and 5 per cent to the value of world trade, half or less the shares for farm 
products.
9 
The distribution of the gains across regions that would result from full trade 
liberalization is clear from the upper half of Table 1. As always, most of the gains 
accrue to the liberalizing region. For example, all but one-tenth (12/122) of the gains 
from high-income countries removing distortions to their trade in farm and food 
products accrues to those countries. Even so, that farm trade reform contributes more 
than one-quarter of the total welfare gains to developing countries from developed 
countries liberalizing their merchandise trade (12/43). As for developing countries 
liberalizing their own farm and food policies, three-quarters of the benefits therefrom 
stay with the developing countries themselves (31/43), and those policies contribute 
almost half of the gains from those countries' overall merchandise trade reform 
(31/65). In total, 26 per cent (43/165) of the gains from global agricultural trade 
liberalization would accrue to developing countries.
10 
Clearly, developing countries as a group have a major stake in the process of 
farm policy reform continuing: according to the model results in Table 1, farm and 
food policies globally contribute 40 per cent (43/108) of the cost to developing 
economies of global goods trade distortions. Textile and clothing policies also harm 
them greatly, but barely one-third as much as farm policies.
11 The Table shows that 60 
per cent of the contribution to developing countries from trade liberalization – and 72 
                                                 
9 Two assumptions are crucial in generating the results reported in Table 1, however. One is that China 
and Taiwan, having joined the WTO at the end of 2001/start of 2002, enjoy the same accelerated access 
to OECD markets under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) as other 
developing countries that were already WTO members. The other crucial assumption is that OECD 
countries fully implement the spirit of the ATC by the end of 2004, that is, they remove remaining 
import quotas and do not replace them with similarly protective instruments such as safeguard 
measures. Dropping either of those assumptions reduces very substantially the estimated gains from 
Uruguay Round implementation (Anderson et al. 1997b), and therefore would raise the potential gains 
from textile and clothing reform in the next and subsequent WTO rounds above that reflected in Table 
1. 
10 This compares with an estimate for 2015 of 32 per cent in a study that examined just agricultural 
trade reform alone (Beghin, Roland-Holst and Mennsbrugghe 2003). 
11 It should be recognised that these results ignore the effect of tariff preference erosion. In so far as a 
developing country receives such preferences at present in OECD markets, the above results slightly 
overstate the potential gains from their reforms. This point is taken up below.  9
per cent of that from farm trade liberalization -- would come from reforms by 
developing countries themselves. This reflects the importance of South-South trade: 
since the mid-1980s, the share of developing countries’ agricultural exports that are 
going to other developing countries has risen from less than 30 per cent to around 40 
per cent (Martin 2001).  
 
What would be the impact on international food prices? 
 
The above GTAP modeling study found that full liberalization of OECD farm 
policies would boost the volume of global agricultural trade by more than 50 per cent, 
but would cause real international food prices to rise by only 5 per cent on average.
12 
For the subset of low-income countries that would remain net food-importing 
economies after such a reform and thereby suffer a deterioration in its terms of trade, 
the extent of the rise in their food import prices from a phased and partial reform (as 
distinct from the instantaneous and complete reform modelled above) would be 
indiscernible from other changes in terms of trade due to such things as exchange rate 
movements. Even the complete reform generates estimated losses for only two of the 
food-importing countries/country groups shown in the disaggregated Table 2, namely 
China and Middle East/North Africa. 
 
Would rich countries gain more than developing countries? 
 
The final two columns of Table 2 reveal that, even though developing 
countries would gain slightly less than rich countries in aggregate dollar terms from a 
move to global free trade in merchandise, they gain much more as a percentage of 
GDP: 1.9 per cent, which is more than three times the percentage for rich countries. 
For Sub-Saharan Africa (other than South Africa) the gain would be 1.4 per cent of its 
GDP. 
Furthermore, those developing countries would gain less if they abstained 
from reforming their own policies. To illustrate the point, the effects on low-income 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia have been examined first without and 
then with those economies participating in reform (Anderson and Yao 2003). If all 
regions other than South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa were to remove their trade 
distortions remaining after the end of 2004 when all Uruguay Round commitments are 
to have been implemented, the world economy would structurally adjust to allow each 
                                                 
12 Beghin et al. (2003) estimate a slightly higher price rise for numerous agricultural commodities (but 
close to zero for others), but their study does not include reform to non-farm trade and so overstates 
what the relative price change would be in a multi-sector agreement.   10
region to exploit even more its comparative advantages. Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia would have to undertake some structural changes within and between key 
sectors even if they chose not to join in such a trade reform (Table 3(a)). In particular, 
agriculture would expand at the expense of labour-intensive manufacturing in those 
low-income countries. However, Sub-Saharan Africa would expand its agricultural 
output more, and contract its manufacturing more, if it also undertakes reforms itself 
than if it stands aside from reform. The trade balance for the different product groups 
is affected by the above production effects plus changes in consumption, following 
relative price and income changes. By comparing Tables 3(a) and 3(b) it is evident 
that net food imports are less for Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia following the 
removal of remaining trade barriers in 2005, but more so when those developing 
countries participate in the reform.  
 
Would poor African countries gain more from Doha if they abstained from reform? 
 
The results in Anderson and Yao (2003) suggest Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
aggregate economic welfare gain is twice as great from participating in than from 
standing aside from further trade liberalization. However, most of that greater gain 
goes to the South African Customs Union. The reason that Other Sub-Saharan Africa 
as an aggregate does not gain more is that the very considerable gains from more 
efficient resource use there would be offset by an adverse change in the region’s terms 
of trade when all of those countries expand their primary product exports 
simultaneously.  
That raises the question: would the economy of each Sub-Saharan African 
country be better off if its government did not participate in the next WTO round? 
The answer is: certainly not. On the contrary, their economy's welfare would be even 
worse if their government did not participate, for several reasons. One is that it would 
forego the economic efficiency gains from reforming its own policies while still 
suffering the terms of trade loss from others’ reforms (since any one of those 
countries is too small for its own policy choice to alter the terms of trade 
significantly).
13 Second, it would forego the opportunity to seek through the 
negotiations greater market access for its particular exports to other countries. And 
third, there is the promise in this next round that any participating poor economies 
that lose from taking part in the multilateral liberalization could secure much more 
                                                 
13 For empirical support for this proposition, see for example Anderson and Strutt (1999) with respect 
to Indonesia. The point is made strongly also in the volume on the Uruguay Round edited by Martin 
and Winters (1996).  11
compensation than in previous rounds, in the form of technical assistance and funds 
for trade policy capacity building (WTO 2001b).  
It is thus in the national economic interest of such countries to be pressured 
from abroad to commit to such reform, painful though that may be politically for its 
government. The political pain tends to be less, and the prospect for a net economic 
gain greater, the more sectors the country involves in the reform. The economic gain 
is prospectively greater the more sectors it involves because a wider net reduces the 
possibility that reform is confined to a subset of sectors that are not the most distorted. 
(When so confined, resources might move from the reformed sector to even more 
inefficient uses, thereby reducing rather than improving the efficiency of national 
resource use.) 
 
Further reasons for developing countries to participate in Doha-induced reform 
 
If the were not enough reasons for a developing country government to 
become an active participant in the Doha Round, including embracing trade reform at 
home, there are at least three other reasons for doing so. One is that the more each 
country is prepared to provide trading partners with greater access to its own market, 
the more those partners are willing to reciprocate by providing greater access to their 
markets. That benefits exporters in all countries, offsetting the loss of domestic 
political support from import-competing producers. The second reason is that once a 
country binds its reform commitments, as required under WTO, its government is 
better able to resist the temptation to give in to political pressure to reverse that 
reform. And the third reason has to do with the spread of globalization, which is 
raising the net political benefits of opening up markets versus remaining protectionist 
and interventionist. The dramatic falls in the costs of doing business across national 
boundaries mean not only that the rewards from opening one’s own economy to 
foreign trade and investment flows have risen, but also that the costs of not adopting 
and maintaining an open, stable and transparent set of economic policies also are 
rising. If, as a result of these globalization forces, the governments of developing 
economies choose to embrace more reform at home, it makes sense to capitalize on 
that decision by using the next WTO Round to demand greater access to trading 
partners’ markets in return. 
 
Qualifications to the global modeling results 
  12
There are three other important source of gains from trade reform that are not 
captured in the above results, namely, gains from reform to trade in services, gains 
from increasing competition and economies of scale, and dynamic gains.  
The nature of service sector policies makes estimating their effects much more 
difficult than is the case for goods barriers to trade. Nonetheless, preliminary 
empirical attempts suggest restrictions on services trade and investment flows are 
very substantial, particularly by developing countries (Findlay and Warren 2000). 
Moreover, the GATS negotiations during the Uruguay Round resulted in almost no 
commitments to lowering those impediments (Hoekman 1996). During that Round 
many developing countries considered the negotiations that led to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as something they had to put up with in 
order to get agriculture and textiles ‘concessions’. Yet the gains to developing 
countries from opening up their services markets, as for developed countries, would 
be enormous. Those gains would come not just directly to consumers but also to 
producers who purchase services as intermediate inputs into their goods production. 
Farmers in particular would benefit from services reform because they depend heavily 
on such things as transport services to get their produce to domestic and overseas 
markets (Anderson and Hoekman 2000).  
While measuring distortions to services trade and mark-ups by imperfectly 
competitive firms is fraught with difficulty, initial attempts are beginning to bear fruit. 
A new study by Francois (2001) includes one set of estimates of the tariff equivalent 
of those distortions in a version of the GTAP model that also incorporates imperfect 
competition and scale economies. Specifically, that study assumes monopolistic 
competition exists in the non-primary sectors involving economies of scale that are 
internal to each firm. These modifications amplify the estimated gains from trade 
considerably. For example, that study finds that if applied tariff rates for both goods 
and services were to be cut in half, the global gains would be US$385 billion, of 
which 51 per cent would be due to services reform. The 49 per cent due to halving 
tariffs on goods trade ($192 billion) in the Francois study compares with the above 
estimate (where no imperfect competition is assumed) of around $250 billion from 
totally removing all tariffs on merchandise trade. The key point to draw from this 
comparison is that the gains from trade reported above should be interpreted as lower-
bound estimates for at least two reasons: because they apply only to goods trade, 
leaving aside the important distortions prevalent in services markets; and because they  13
are based on the assumption that there are no economies of scale and that perfect 
competition prevails in all sectors. 
None of the studies reported above draw on a truly dynamic economic model. 
They measure well the effects of producers reallocating their resources and consumers 
adjusting their purchases when relative product prices change with trade reform, but 
they do not measure the impact of such reform on investment behaviour. Yet we 
know from experience that when markets are freed up, investors divert their funds 
towards expanding the now-more-profitable activities and away from the now-less-
profitable ones. They are also willing to invest more in aggregate, because of the 
reduced uncertainty associated with binding the reforms in WTO schedules. That 
boost to investment applies even more following the reductions in barriers to foreign 
investment and hence international technology transfers of the past two decades. Thus 
economic growth is boosted by that diversion and expansion of investment funds, 
over and above the boost in output from reallocating existing resource endowments. 
This additional effect is omitted from most empirical modelling efforts for two 
reasons: partly because it takes much longer for analysts to build and to run dynamic 
models than comparative static ones, and partly because the extent to which investors 
respond to changing incentives is less well understood and hence cannot be included 
with as much certainty as the other behavioural characteristics that are common to 
both comparative static and dynamic models. Keeping that in mind, it is nonetheless 
instructive to note the results of a recent study that examined the range of outcomes 
generated as the responsiveness of productivity to openness is varied. 
The World Bank (2002, Ch. 6) conducted a study very similar to the one 
reported above, and obtained very similar results when its version of the GTAP model 
was in comparative static mode (a global welfare gain from complete liberalization of 
merchandise trade of $355 billion per year by 2015, compared with the present 
study’s estimate of $254 billion as early as 2005 when the world economy would be 
somewhat smaller, and with agricultural policies still responsible for about two-thirds 
of that gain). When their same model was switched into dynamic mode, however, that 
global gain increased two- to three-fold over reasonable ranges of productivity 
responsiveness parameters. This adds further weight to the claim that the earlier 
welfare results should be considered as very much lower-bound estimates of the gains 
from trade liberalization.  
  In short, developing countries have much to gain economically from taking 
part in the next round of WTO negotiations to liberalize trade, and more so the more  14
they are willing to embrace reform at home so as to enable their firms to take greatest 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the opening up of markets abroad. And 
this applies especially to agricultural trade reform. 
 
 
III.  Likely impacts of further reform on particular groups of 
developing countries 
 
  In thinking about the impacts that further trade reform could have on people in 
developing countries, it needs to be recognised that developing countries are quite 
heterogeneous in their degree of food nutrition and in their production and trade 
specialization patterns. This is evident, for example, in the sample of 23 countries 
included in a recent FAO study on the impact of the Uruguay Round (Mathews 2002). 
Table 4 shows that the proportion of the population that is undernourished is not 
highly correlated with the income grouping of countries. Also clear from that table is 
that not all low-income countries are classified as LDCs (least-developed countries), 
nor is the subset of them that are net importers of food defined on a calorie basis 
highly correlated with the WTO’s list of so-called NFIDCs (net food-importing 
developing countries). And the countries shown vary hugely in the value of their food 
imports when expressed as a percentage of either total exports or just exports of 
agricultural products, with again not a high correlation between those indicators and 
the food-deficit status of countries.  
Given that heterogeneity, it is helpful for present purposes to categorize 
developing countries as follows: 
•  net exporters of foods protected by OECD countries (grains, meats, dairy 
products, oilseed products, sugar, fruits and vegetables); 
•  those sufficiently close to self sufficient in protected OECD products as to be 
likely net exporters under global free trade; 
•  those net food importers who would remain so under free trade at home and 
abroad and are net exporers of: 
o tropical agricultural products (e.g. beverages) 
o non-agricultural primary products (e.g. petroleum) 
o non-primary products (e.g. textiles and clothing). 
It is also helpful to recognise that within each country there are various types 
of households. For present purposes the key ones are net sellers of food, landless farm  15
labourers, and non-farm low-skilled labourers (including underemployed workers). 
Those households mainly supplying non-farm skilled labour and/or capital typically 
are not poor and so are of less concern here.  
With those categories in mind, we turn to some of the concerns raised in the 
paper’s introduction. 
 
Does it matter that global trade reform erodes tariff preferences? 
 
Among the net exporters of foods protected by OECD countries are 
developing countries who receive some form of preferential access to OECD country 
markets. Such countries typically have put their negotiating efforts more into seeking 
extensions of preferential trading schemes than into cuts to remaining most-favoured-
nation (MFN) barriers to trade in agricultural, textile or other products. While that 
option is currently still before them, it is worth considering whether it is wise to take 
it up.  
There are several types of preferential access schemes that have been designed 
to mitigate the effects of high tariffs on exports from developing countries to 
advanced economies. They range from very broad ones with minor tariff concessions, 
such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), to market-specific ones such as 
the European Union’s provision of duty free access for certain volumes of certain 
products from certain developing countries (mostly former colonies of EU member 
states) in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP – formerly the Lome 
Convention, now the Cotonou Agreement), to the new EU proposal for duty- and 
quota-free access for most exports from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs, as 
classified by the United Nations). To what extent are these arrangements stepping 
stones or stumbling blocks towards better market access abroad for poor countries? In 
particular, how effective are these arrangements as compared with MFN 
liberalizations under the WTO in delivering benefits to poorer economies (as distinct 
from just being easier politically for national governments to sign)?  
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) developing countries that have been 
granted preferential access to European Union markets for some of their exports 
typically consider themselves privileged, believing that it better enables them to 
compete in those markets. Not only do they not have to pay the same import duty as 
other foreign suppliers, but also they receive the EU domestic price, which is higher 
than the international price to the extent of the protection afforded by the tariff and 
other restrictions such as quotas on non-ACP imports.  16
Beneficial though this might sound, five important points need to be borne in 
mind. First, many other equally poor but non-ACP developing countries are harmed 
by the ACP preferences. This was made abundantly clear in the 1990s during the 
infamous dispute-settlement case that was brought to the WTO concerning the EU’s 
banana import regime. One background study showed that for every dollar of benefit 
that the banana policy brought to producers in ACP countries, the regime harmed non-
ACP developing country producers by almost exactly one dollar – and in the process 
harmed EU consumers by more than thirteen dollars (Borrell 1999a). It is difficult to 
imagine a more inefficient way of transferring welfare to poor countries, since EU 
citizens could have, through direct payments, been thirteen times as effective in 
helping ACP banana producers and not hurt non-ACP banana producers at all. Such 
wasteful trade diversion is avoided under non-discriminatory, most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) liberalizations that result from multilateral trade negotiations under WTO. 
Second, the additional production that is encouraged in those ACP countries 
when they get privileged access to the high-priced EU market is not internationally 
competitive at current prices (otherwise it would have been produced prior to getting 
that preferential treatment). Indeed the industry as a whole may not have existed in 
the ACP country had the preference scheme not been introduced.
14 In that case, its 
profits are likely to be lean despite the scheme, and would disappear if and when the 
scheme is dismantled. Efforts to learn the skills needed, and the sunk capital invested 
in that industry rather than in ones in which the country has a natural comparative 
advantage, would then earn no further rewards. 
Third, the ACP preferential access scheme under the Lome Convention has 
not been a reciprocal agreement, that is, the developing countries were not required to 
open their markets to EU products. While that makes life easy for ACP politicians, it 
contributes nothing to the removal of the wasteful trade-restrictive policies of the 
ACP countries. This contrasts with market access negotiations under WTO, which are 
characterized by reciprocity: you receive greater access to my markets (on an MFN 
basis) on the condition that your trading partner receives a similar degree of 
improvement in access to your markets.  
Fourth, in so far as a developing country sells only part of its exports into a 
protected market to which it has preferential access, it receives a lower price for the 
rest of its exports than would be the case under free trade because of the price-
                                                 
14 Alternatively, the ACP scheme may have caused an existing industry to become less competitive. An 
extreme example of an industry that has ossified as a consequence of regulations introduced to share 
the expected benefits of EU preferences is sugar in Mauritius (Borrell 1999b).  17
depressing effect of that OECD protection on the free international market. It is 
therefore conceivable that the weighted average price for its exports is lower than 
what it would be under free trade, notwithstanding the benefit of preferential access 
for some of its exports. 
Fifth and perhaps most importantly, the ACP preference scheme reduces very 
substantially the capacity for developing countries as a group to press for more access 
to EU markets. It does this in two way: by reducing the number of such countries 
arguing against protection, and by creating a subset of developing countries 
supporting the EU’s protectionist stance (in order to continue to receive the high 
domestic prices in the EU market). This point is crucial, and yet it is often not 
appreciated. Perhaps if these preferences had not been offered in the first place, 
developing countries would have negotiated much more vigorously in previous GATT 
rounds for lower tariffs on agricultural and other imports into the EU. That in turn 
would have placed greater pressure on Japan and others to reduce their agricultural 
protectionism also. The end result would have been higher international prices for 
agricultural products that, for developing country producers as a group, may have 
been more than sufficient to offset the lower prices received in the EU market for a  
favoured subset of those producers. 
A similar set of provisos can be made about the EU’s recent proposal to 
extend preferences for UN-designated ‘least developed countries’ (LDCs). That 
initiative would provide duty-and quota-free access to the EU for exports of all 
merchandise except arms. It received in-principle, best-endeavours endorsement at the 
WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, but without any specific timetable.
15 
Liberal though that proposal sounds, note that it does not include trade in 
services (of which the most important for LDCs would be movement of natural 
persons, that is, freedom for LDC labourers to work in the EU or other high-wage 
countries).
16 Also, a number of safeguard provisions are included in addition to the 
EU’s normal anti-dumping measures. Furthermore, access to three politically 
sensitive agricultural markets, bananas, rice and sugar, would be phased in by the EU 
only gradually over the next eight years (and would be subject to stricter safeguards).  
Several empirical studies of the proposal have already appeared. A World 
Bank study by Ianchovichina, Mattoo and Olarreaga (2001) compares the EU 
                                                 
15 In Paragraph 42 of the Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2001b) it simply says: “We commit ourselves 
to the objective of duty-free, quota-free market access for products originating from LDCs.” 
16 On the potential gains from freeing international trade in unskilled labour services globally, see 
Walmsley and Winters (2002).  18
proposal, from the viewpoint of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with recent initiatives of 
the United States and Japan. Their GTAP modelling results suggest that even the most 
generous interpretation of the US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (which they 
model as unrestricted access to the US for all SSA exports) would benefit SSA very 
little because the US economy is already very open and, in the products where it is not 
(e.g. textiles and clothing), SSA countries have little comparative advantage. Likewise 
they find the Japanese proposal of free access to Japan’s market for industrial 
products helps SSA hardly at all, since the region exports few industrial products. By 
contrast, the EU proposal, especially if it were to apply to all Quad countries (the EU, 
the US, Canada and Japan), would have a sizeable effect on SSA trade and welfare – 
provided agriculture is included in the deal. Just from EU access alone, SSA exports 
would be raised by more than US$0.5 billion and SSA economic welfare would 
increase by $0.3 billion per year (a 0.2 per cent boost). This is very similar to a recent 
estimate by UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 3).  
The estimated benefits are not surprising given that agriculture and food 
products account for more than half SSA exports. These items are highly protected in 
the EU and other Quad countries, and little is provided for them in the way of 
preferential access under the GSP. The results overstate the benefits of the EU 
proposal, however, as this World Bank study assumes all SSA countries (excluding 
relatively wealthy South Africa and Mauritius), not just the LDCs amongst them, 
would get duty- and quota-free access. 
Another World Bank study, by Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2002a), uses a 
partial equilibrium approach and looks at the benefit of the EU initiative for LCDs not 
just in SSA but globally. It finds that trade of LDCs would increase by US$2.5 billion 
per year if all Quad countries provided them duty- and quota-free access on all 
merchandise.
17 However, almost half of that increase would come as a result of trade 
diversion from other developing countries. The authors suggest this is trivial because 
it represents less than 0.1 per cent of other developing countries’ exports (about $1.1 
billion).
18 That misses a similar point to the one made above, however. It is that if the 
48 LDCs are given such preferences, they will become advocates for rather than 
                                                 
17 This and other estimates of gains from preferential market access provisions need to discounted to 
the extent that rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary barriers, anti-dumping duties and the like limit 
the actual trade allowed. For a detailed analysis of these types of restrictions on EU imports from 
Bangladesh in recent years, see UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 5). 
18 The impact outside the LDC group would be far from trivial for Mauritius, however, since the vast 
bulk of its exports are quota-restricted sales of clothing and sugar to the EU and US. See the discussion 
in UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 6).  19
against the continuation of MFN tariff peaks for agriculture and textiles – diminishing 
considerably the number of WTO members negotiating for their reduction. It may be 
true that reductions in agricultural and textile tariffs would help LDCs much less than 
it would help other developing countries, as the study by Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga 
(2002a) finds; but the gains to consumers in the Quad would be more than sufficient 
to allow them to increase their aid to LDCs to compensate for the loss of income from 
preference erosion. To put the point in a blunter but more general way, trade can be 
worse than direct aid if the trade is preferential and thereby distortionary. 
 
Wouldn’t net food-importing developing countries lose from higher food import 
bills? 
Among the net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), some fear 
agricultural protection cuts by OECD countries will lead to an unaffordably higher 
international food import bill. Yet even those developing countries – who may be part 
of one of the country aggregates in Table 2 – need not lose out from farm support cuts 
abroad. If, for example, they are close to self-sufficient in food without price supports 
(as many net food importing developing countries are), and reform abroad raises the 
international price of food, they may switch to become sufficiently export-oriented 
that their net national economic welfare rises. A second possibility is that the 
developing country's own policies are sufficiently biased against food production that 
the country is a net importer, despite having a comparative advantage in food. In that 
case, the international price rise can improve national economic welfare even if the 
price change is insufficient to turn that distorted economy into a net food exporter 
(Anderson and Tyers 1993). That comes about because the higher price of food 
attracts mobile resources away from more-distorted sectors, thereby improving the 
efficiency of national resource allocation. Because of these two possibilities, the 
number of poor countries for whom a rise in international food prices might cause 
some hardship is much smaller than the number that are currently not net exporters of 
agricultural products. 
What about the other NFIDCs? Some are exporters of tropical agricultural 
products such as beverages, while others export energy raw materials or other mining 
products. They would be less concerned about a higher food import bill if they 
received in return better access to OECD markets for more-processed versions of their 
primary products. Tariff escalation in many instances makes access difficult through  20
raising the effective protection to processors in OECD countries, who crowd out 
potential exports from developing country processors. 
What about those developing countries whose comparative advantage is 
gradually moving from primary products to (initially unskilled) labour-intensive 
manufactures, as in much of Asia? While that industrialization lowers their direct 
interest in agricultural trade reform abroad, it heightens their keenness to see barriers 
to exports of textiles and clothing lowered. That interest of theirs in textile trade 
expansion should be shared by agricultural-exporting developing countries, for if the 
former group could export more manufactures, it would tend to become a larger net 
importer of agricultural products. Conversely, lowered industrial-country barriers to 
agricultural trade would reduce the need for the more land-abundant developing 
countries to move into manufactures in competition with the newly industrializing 
ones. Scope clearly exists for the two groups to band together and negotiate as a 
single voice calling for barriers to both farm and textile trade to be lowered, so that 
each group can better exploit its comparative advantage to the direct benefit of the 
vast majority of poor people in both. If that means lowering protected domestic food 
prices, some farm labourers will find jobs in the expanding light industrial sector 
where wages will have risen. Even those staying in agriculture need not lose, if 
savings from cuts in price supports were used to reduce underinvestment in such areas 





Wouldn’t higher international food prices increase poverty and food insecurity 
for poor households? 
 
The impact of trade liberalization on income distribution and thereby on 
poverty at the household level is not always clear: even though the effects of trade 
policies on capital owners and workers have been studied by trade theorists for 
centuries, applying that theory to the real world turns out to be a complex empirical 
task (Winters 2000; McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 2001; Hoekman et al. 2002). This 
is because the economy-wide effects depend (a) on the shares of households’ income 
from different productive factors such as labour and land, whose prices will have 
changed (depending on the size of the changes in relative producer prices, factor  21
substitutability, factor intensities, and factor mobility between sectors), (b) on their 
expenditure shares on different products (whose consumer prices also will have 
changed and not necessarily to the same extent as producer prices not least because of 
marketing margins), and (c) on any changes in net transfers to them (e.g. increased 
handouts, decreased taxation, more remittances from urban relatives). Those 
complexities make it difficult to generalize a priori, or even in the face of empirical 
modelling studies when they report effects of reform just on production, trade, prices 
and aggregate economic welfare. Even so, some observations are nonetheless worth 
making about the effects on poverty and food security of reducing agricultural 
protectionism globally. 
Most low-income countries have not propped up the producer price of food. In 
so far as an international food price rise is transmitted domestically,
19 the vast 
majority of the poor would benefit directly. This is because they are in farm 
households and are net sellers of food. Even poor landless farm labourers who are net 
buyers of food would benefit indirectly from agricultural trade liberalization via a rise 
in the demand for their unskilled farm labour, assuming that raises their wage 
sufficient to more than offset the rise in food prices in rural areas. Since the more 
affluent people in cities would find it relatively easy to pay a little extra for food, the 
only other major vulnerable group is the under-employed urban poor. But even that 
group may not be worse off in so far as trade reform generates a more-than-offsetting 
increase in the demand for (often informal sector) services that use that group’s labour 
relatively intensively. 
  What about the impact of reform on food price variability and other aspects of 
food security, especially as it affects the poorest households? Contrary to popular 
belief, trade liberalization is much more likely to reduce than raise food insecurity for 
the vast majority of the world’s poor. Food security means always having access to 
the minimum supply of basic food necessary for survival. The key to that, in addition 
to peace and greater efficiency in the functioning of staple food markets, is 
strengthened purchasing power of the poor. That is, enhancing food security is mainly 
about alleviating poverty. The rate of food self-sufficiency is at most only a 
supplementary indicator, and only while there remains a perception that food 
insecurity rises when the level of food self-sufficiency in basic foods falls much 
below 100 per cent. 
                                                 
19 The elasticity of price transmission is usually less than one for importing countries, especially in the 
short run where governments intervene at the border in an attempt to cushion the domestic market from 
international price fluctuations (Tyers and Anderson 1992, Sharma 2003).   22
Eliminating all agricultural policy distortions in developed countries would 
raise international prices for agricultural products on average, and reduce their 
variance by ‘thickening’ the market, which would stimulate production in non-
protected countries.
20 According to one recent study (Diao, Somwaru and Roe 2001), 
that would boost the value of agricultural exports of developing countries by 24 per 
cent and dampen their agricultural imports by 2 per cent. That suggests food self-
sufficiency in many low-income countries would rise. As well, since a high 
proportion of the poorest households in developing countries are producers and net 
sellers of food, they would benefit from such reform. In both respects, therefore, food 
security for the vast majority of households in low-income countries should be 
enhanced on average. Those same households would be helped even further if 
agricultural price-depressing policies were in place domestically and these are 
removed. The latter reform also boosts self-sufficiency in agricultural products and 
thereby boosts even further perceived food security in those economies.  
The Diao, Somwaru and Roe (2001) study estimates that eliminating 
developing countries’ own agricultural price distortions would boost their farm export 
value by a further 6 per cent. True, the households that are net buyers of food in such 
economies will face higher food prices; but whether they become less food secure 
depends also on what happens to their earnings (and/or transfers). If they are landless 
rural poor, their earning prospects will have risen along with the growth in demand 
for farm labour, or for labour in local enterprises that grow as farmers spend their 
enhanced income on simple manufactures and services made nearby. As for urban 
households, the vast majority of them are more affluent than those in rural households 
and so can well afford to pay higher market prices for food. This suggests only a 
small proportion of households in low-income economies would be net food buyers at 
risk of becoming more food-insecure as a result of rising domestic food prices 
following trade liberalization. Even that group could be better off if developed 
countries were to reduce also their barriers to imports of textiles and clothing, since 
that would expand the demand for unskilled labour in the apparel industry of 
developing countries. 
What about in developing countries where agricultural trade liberalization 
means lower domestic prices for agricultural products because such countries have 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately ‘dirty’ tariffication and the continuing use of specific tariffs by developed countries, 
the setting of high ceiling bindings by developing countries, and the introduction of tariff rate quotas 
greatly weakened (relative to pure ad valorem tariffication) the extent to which the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture raised the mean and lowered the variance of international food prices during 
the past seven years.   23
kept domestic food prices above international levels via import restrictions? It is true 
that removing those distortions will reduce farm incomes in those countries (but by 
more for larger than smaller farms), and urban households will benefit from lower 
food prices. However, food self-sufficiency will fall – and it is the fall in both farm 
earnings and food self-sufficiency that focuses the attention of those who argue that 
agricultural trade liberalization is bad for poor households. Focusing on just the direct 
effects of agricultural trade policy reform can be misleading, however, not least 
because it does not take account of the fact that such reform is typically done in the 
context of multilateral, economy-wide liberalization. Being multilateral means that 
other countries’ farm protection cuts raise international food prices, and so less of a 
price fall occurs than when a country cuts it agricultural protection unilaterally. And 
being economy-wide means the decline in demand for farm labour is more or less 
than offset by a growth in demand for labour in expanding non-farm industries.  
In short, at least two points are worth stressing.
21 First, reducing agricultural 
policy distortions in developed countries would increase the mean and decrease the 
variance of international prices for agricultural products, which would stimulate 
production in other countries. That suggests food self-sufficiency would rise in those 
developing countries that transmit international prices to their domestic market. 
Second, since a high proportion of the poorest households in low-income countries 
are producers and net sellers of food, they would be key beneficiaries of such reform. 
In both respects, therefore, food security for the vast majority of households in low-
income countries should be enhanced on average. Those same households would be 
helped even further by the reduction/removal of any policies that are depressing 
farmers returns (e.g., directly via agricultural export taxes or indirectly via import 
protection for non-agricultural sectors or an over-valued currency). The latter reform 
also boosts self-sufficiency in agricultural products and thereby boosts perceived food 
security even further in those economies.  
 
What about lowering domestic food prices in protective developing countries, as 
with China’s accession to WTO? 
 
  Those food-importing developing countries that currently protect their farmers 
have a different set of concerns. The case of China’s accession to WTO illustrates the 
                                                 
21 For a more in-depth analysis of the food security aspects of WTO farm trade reform, see Diaz-
Bonilla, Thomas and Robinson (2003).  24
situation. That accession, which will be on-going until the latter part of the present 
decade, involves a decline in the domestic price of some farm products. Because farm 
households in China are among the country’s poorest, that trade reform is often 
pointed to as an example of one that will exacerbate poverty. To explore that 
possibility, a set of empirical studies was commissioned recently by the World Bank. 
A global economy wide numerical simulation model was used to generate the changes 
in product and factor prices expected from the commitments to reform that China 
made in its accession negotiations. These were then mapped to the earning and 
spending patterns of various household types and regions in China as revealed in 
China’s rural and urban household surveys.  
The conventional wisdom that China’s WTO accession will impoverish its 
rural people, via greater import competition in its agricultural markets, need not 
prevail. One needs to keep in mind that, even if prices of some (land-intensive) farm 
products fall, those for other (labour-intensive) farm products could rise. Also, the 
removal of restrictions on China’s exports of textiles and clothing will boost town and 
village enterprises, so demand for non-farm workers in rural areas may grow even if 
demand for farm labour in aggregate falls.  
New estimates of the likely changes in agricultural prices as a result of WTO 
accession are drawn on to examine the factor reward implication of China’s WTO 
accession empirically using the GTAP model. Results reported in Anderson, 
Ianchovichina and Huang (2002) suggest farm-nonfarm and Western-Eastern income 
inequality may well rise but rural-urban income inequality need not. That conclusion 
is supported by a more-detailed study of households by Chen and Ravallion (2002). 
They find negligible impacts on inequality and a small reduction in poverty in 
aggregate, but some variance across households and regions. Farm households tend to 
lose, especially those highly dependent on feed grain production (in Northeastern 
China) and in hinterland regions with weak links to the booming non-farm sectors and 
eastern provinces. But the losses are at most very small, amounting to less than 5 per 
cent of household income. Facilitating the transfer of some labour from less-lucrative 
farm activities to now-more-lucrative non-farm work could (with the usual 
remittances back to the farm household) be sufficient to ensure all gain from China’s 
WTO accession.  
The study by Anderson, Ianchovichina and Huang (2002) also examines how 
much difference it could make if the hukou system that restricts rural-to-urban 
migration were to be abolished. Their results suggest that the sign of the effects could  25
be switched to favour the poorer farm households – albeit at the expense of the richer 
non-farm ones – if the remaining WTO accession-related reforms were to be 
accompanied by reform of the hukou system that allowed some members of those 
households to obtain higher-paying non-farm employment and repatriate earnings 
back to their farm family. And of course aggregate national economic welfare would 
be enhanced by that labour market reform as well. This illustrates the general point 
that gains from trade reform will be greater, the more liberal are domestic product and 
factor markets. 
A summary of those modelling results can be seen in Table 5. Without labour 
market reform, WTO accession for China would slightly reduce rewards to unskilled 
farm labour and to agricultural land while raising rewards to all other factors of 
production. That suggests farm households earning less than 60 per cent of their 
income from unskilled nonfarm work could be harmed (albeit only slightly) from 
WTO accession. If complete abolition of restrictions to off-farm migration 
accompanied WTO accession reforms, however, the final column of Table 5 suggests 
all types of farm households could be better off as more family members are attracted 
to higher-paying off-farm work.  
  In so far as China’s WTO accession puts upward pressure on international 
farm product prices, that would have the same pro-poor consequences in other 
developing countries as the multilateral farm trade reform discussed above. However, 
the extent of that price rise and the associated increase in China’s imports of farm 
products is going to be minor, and certainly will not, as implied by the title of Lester 
Brown’s 1995 book, ‘starve the world’ (see the empirical results in Anderson et al. 
1997a,b). 
 
IV.  Strategies for furthering reform 
 
Priorities for agricultural policy reform in the Doha Round 
 
Adding poverty alleviation to the list of major concerns of the international 
community only adds to what was already an overwhelmingly strong case for 
reducing distortions to world food markets, based on greater national and global 
efficiency, improvements in intra- and inter-national equity, and better natural 
resource and environmental outcomes. From the viewpoint of poverty alleviation in 
low-income countries, what should be the priorities for agricultural policy reform in  26
the Doha Round? Consider in turn the main issues of export subsidies, import 




Nothing less than a ban on farm export subsidies is needed to bring agriculture 
into line with non-farm products under the GATT. They are, after all, almost 
exclusively a Western European phenomenon apart from sporadic US involvement: 
five-sixths of all export subsidies in the mid-1990s were granted by the EU, and all 
but 2 per cent of the rest were accounted for by the US, Norway and Switzerland 
(Tangermann and Josling 1999, p. 16; OECD 2002b). The EU has proposed just a 45 
per cent cut in budgetary outlays on export subsidies, while virtually all other WTO 
members’ submissions call for their rapid phase-out. Also, it has been suggested that 
the any assistance provided via export credits, food aid and/or export state trading 




As for the other two key interventions, import barriers and production 
subsidies, recent empirical work suggests agricultural market access restrictions by 
OECD countries are currently far more important restraints on growth and poverty 
reduction in developing economies than are OECD domestic support measures 
(Hoekman, Ng and Olarreago 2002b). Access is currently restricted by tariffs and 
tariff rate quotas (TRQs), in addition to technical barriers including sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures. Among the things developing countries would wish to 
see are the conversion of specific tariffs (which harm low-priced exports from 
developing country most) to ad valorem tariffs, the removal of TRQs because they 
harm most those with least familiarity with developed-country licensing procedures, 
and less-onerous SPS measures because developing country exporters are least able to 
overcome those barriers. 
While TRQs guarantee a certain level of market access at a low or zero tariff 
for some products, they have several undesirable features: they legitimize a role for 
state trading agencies, they generate quota rents that convert would-be free traders 
into supporters of the protective regime, they introduce scope for discriminating 
between countries, and they can reduce national welfare by much more than similarly 
protective import tariffs. If they cannot be eliminated immediately, developing 
countries should at least seek their expansion at the same time as seeking reductions  27
in out-of-quota bound tariffs. A quota expansion need not expand trade and welfare, 
however, for it is always possible for the quota administrator to allocate quotas so as 
to ensure under-fill. Stronger disciplines on and greater transparency of quota 
administration are therefore also required. 
  Reductions in tariffs too may not expand trade, because the bound (out-of-
quota) tariff for many farm products is several times its applied rate in numerous 
countries. Developing countries also worry about the tariff escalation, tariff peaks, 
and specific (as distinct from ad valorem) tariffs their exporters face. A repeat of the 
Uruguay Round pace of reform as proposed by the EU (an average 36 per cent cut 
with a minimum of 15 per cent on each tariff line spread over several years) would 
again produce almost no cut in actual tariff protection. A formula involving higher 
percentage cuts on higher tariffs would be more likely to deliver cuts to applied rates. 
The revised (18 March) draft of the modalities paper by the Chair of the WTO’s 
Committee on Agriculture (WTO 2003) contains such an approach, and also proposes 
higher cuts on processed items where tariff escalation exists, while still proposing 
lesser cuts for developing than for developed countries (and none for least-developed 
countries) – even though poorer countries have on average even bigger gaps between 
their ceiling bindings and applied rates, and even though their tariffs on food imports 




The revised modalities paper – which has been rejected as too modest by the 
US and Cairns Group and too radical by the EU and others with high agricultural 
protection
23 – also proposes significant cuts in domestic support for farmers (WTO 
2003). However, it is conceivable that domestic measures could be found to 
compensate farmers in developed countries for tariff and export subsidy cuts while 
not eroding the welfare gains such cuts could bestow on developing countries. 
Dimaranan et al. (2002), for example, use the GTAP model to show that a shift in 
developed countries from market price support (amber box) measures to fully 
compensating decoupled land-based payments (blue box measures) could benefit 
most developing countries. But what if less-efficient measures were used? This is part 
of the broader issue of the risk of re-instrumentation of protection. 
                                                 
22 For a comprehensive analysis of flexible Swiss-type formulae see Francois and Martin (2003). 
23 For a first analysis of the likely effects of implementing the Harbinson proposal (on its own, without 
any non-agricultural reforms), see FOI (2003). That study, using the GTAP model, finds that following 
full implementation global economic welfare would be higher by almost $100 billion per year and 
agricultural exports would be 25 per cent greater despite the elimination of export subsidies.  28
 
What are the risks of re-instrumentation of agricultural protection? 
 
  If increasing market access in OECD countries through reducing farm 
production and export subsidies and agricultural protection is able to contribute to 
poverty alleviation in developing countries, then to what extent would that objective 
be compromised by efforts to substitute new forms of assistance to farmers as 
traditional protective instruments are phased out? The imposition of tariff rate quotas 
accompanied by very high out-of-quota tariffs, and the administration of quotas so as 
to ensure less than full usage of them, were two ways in which agricultural protection 
changes following the Uruguay Round were minimized – to the point that many 
developing countries struggled to identify any significant growth in agricultural 
export earnings resulting from the UR Agreement on Agriculture (Mathews 2002). 
There are at least two ways in which cuts in assistance to developed country 
farmers may be minimized following the Doha Round too. One is via an expansion of 
exempt support measures to satisfy so-called non-trade concerns related to the alleged 
‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture – even though those concerns can readily be met 
much more directly and hence in less trade-distorting ways than is being proposed 
(Anderson 2000; Paarlberg, Bredahl and Lee 2002). While the multifunctionality 
concept originated in the richest, most-protective economies, it is now being 
embraced by farmer groups in numerous developing countries as well. More than 
twenty such countries’ farm groups plus the EU met in Geneva 23-25 October 2002 
and signed a declaration calling on WTO members to acknowledge that “agriculture 
cannot be treated in the same way as industrial sectors” because farming “fulfils a 
multitude of functions …” Since then, however, some developing countries have been 
at pains to stress that their concerns are very different from those emphasized by rich 
countries. 
The other likely form of re-instrumentation is via the adoption of stricter 
standards that then act as technical barriers to trade. Quarantine measures are an 
obvious case in point. They often add relatively large cost burdens to exporters from 
poorer countries because those countries do not have the same capability as developed 
countries to meet high standards (Wilson 2002). Numerous developing countries have 
cited examples of SPS measures of OECD countries that are already significantly 
hindering their exports (Mathews 2002). Another is the increasing use of geographical 
indications and traditional expressions aimed at differentiating rich-country products,  29
which effectively reduces the demand for substitute products from other countries.
24 
A less-obvious possibility is the restriction of imports of food products containing 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The direct, short-term effects of a ban on 
GMOs could help exports from developing countries that choose not to adopt GMOs, 
even though it harms those who have already adopted GMOs (Nielsen and Anderson 
2001; Anderson and Yao 2004). But the indirect, longer-term, and potentially much 
larger effects are adverse for the world’s poor, namely, the disincentive effect of such 
restrictions on investment in agricultural biotechnologies that could lower food prices 
and/or raise the nutritional attributes of foods available in developing countries (not to 
mention the potential damage a GMO trade dispute could inflict on the global trading 
system – see Isaac and Kerr 2003). 
 
How can the prospects for and benefits from reform be maximized? 
 
Consumers in developed countries are more concerned with food safety and 
the environment than with the price-raising effect of agricultural protection. They are 
therefore not a force for reform except perhaps for switching support to payments tied 
to better environmental or food safety outcomes. So the political force for agricultural 
(and textiles and clothing) reform in developed countries has to come from those 
countries’ exporters of other industrial goods and of services. That requires 
developing countries providing increased access to those producers’ exports as a quid 
pro quo. Such reform would provide additional benefits to the farm sector of poor 
countries, both directly through lower-cost inputs and indirectly through the currency 
devaluation that would accompany it. While the farm sector is typically a weak 
lobbying force in poor countries, membership of or association with a coalition such 
as the Cairns Group could enhance its lobbying skills.
25 So too could support from the 
more-enlightened non-government development agencies who realize how damaging 
OECD farm policies are to sustainable development in poorer countries (see, e.g., 
Oxfam 2002).  
As mentioned above, textile and clothing exporters have an indirect interest in 
seeing agricultural protection reductions in their own country as well as in the OECD, 
                                                 
24 See, for example, the concerns raised by Cairns Group members in WTO (2001c). An analysis of the 
prospects for producers in developing countries also harnessing GIs as a marketing tool is providedc in 
Maskus (2003). 
25 Within agriculture, developing countries’ interests in Doha agenda items align closely with those of 
the Cairns Group of non-subsidizing agricultural-exporting countries (Bjornskov and Lind 2002). See 
Cairns Group (2002) for its proposal on market access in the Doha Round.  30
so that potential food-exporting countries can access those markets instead of 
competing with them by turning to manufacturing. An alliance between those two 
types of developing countries would allow them to jointly push for greater agricultural 
and textile market access in rich countries.  
People in developing countries also need to recognise that while so-called 
special and differential treatment (such as slower reform for developing countries, as 
in the Harbinson proposal for the Doha round) may be what their governments prefer 
for political reasons, it is not in the economic interests of developing countries. Faster 
and larger reforms bestow greater national gains from trade liberalization.  
To maximize the gains from trade reform, however, developing countries need 
to have well-functioning domestic economies. If factor markets are inflexible, or 
public infrastructures are in poor shape, only a fraction of the gains from trade reform 
will be realized. 
 
How best to deal with residual concerns about food security? 
 
 
If a society would feel too food-insecure under laissez faire, then what needs 
to be determined is a sense of (a) its willingness to pay for more security by various 
means, and (b) the costs of those insurance measures. One such measure involves 
encouraging the holding of food stocks above those that would be commercially 
viable -- a public good that is explicitly allowed for in Annex 2 of the WTO's 
Agreement on Agriculture. The optimal level of encouragement is that which boosts 
stocks so that the marginal social benefit in terms of food security equals the marginal 
social cost of that intervention. Costs are non-trivial, however. Storage and interest 
costs and the costs of spoilage and quality deterioration can amount to more than 20 
per cent a year. The cost part of the calculation also would need to include the risk of 
government failure if stocks were to be managed by an inefficient (or corrupt) public 
agency.  
If greater domestic production capability was considered by society to be one 
of the desirable means of boosting food security (because of a perception that food 
import dependence is too unreliable), there are far less costly ways of achieving that 
than via farm product price supports and import protection. For example, boosting 
production alone, rather than also taxing consumption as with an import barrier, 
would be a lower-cost and less-trade-distortive means of achieving that end. Even 
more effective could be improvements in land tenure and more investment in the  31
stocks of primary factors used in food production: agricultural research,
26 rural human 
capital, and rural infrastructure (Otsuka 2002). That would provide an especially high 
payoff in situations where, as in so many countries, there has been gross under-
investment in these activities in the past. Simultaneously, production could be boosted 
in many low-income countries simply by better clarifying and enforcing land rights, 
since they are a key source of collateral for securing loans for productive investments 
by farm households. 
Where targeted programs to boost the earning capacity of the poverty-stricken 
(e.g. via basic education/training) are still not enough to boost their food security in 
the short term, targeted consumer subsidies to provide that core group with food 
staples are much less costly than general subsidies to all food consumers via price-
depressing agricultural policies. Food aid that is targeted to just that group could be 
readily provided by the international community without depressing very much the 
prices received by farmers in recipient countries.
27 And greater technical and 
economic cooperation in the areas of agricultural research, rural education and health, 
and rural infrastructure may be important co-requisites of trade policy reform if 




V.  Conclusions and implications for developing countries 
 
Low-income countries have much to gain from the WTO’s Doha Round of 
trade negotiations. In particular, they have a strong vested interest in working together 
to push simultaneously for the freeing up of trade in both farm and textile products. 
Achieving that end will require some opening up of developing economies themselves 
as a quid pro quo, but that will benefit rather than hurt the poor in their own 
economies -- especially if it includes reducing the relatively high levels of protection 
currently afforded many capital-intensive manufacturing industries and the service 
sector. For the subset of net food-importing developing countries that also protect 
farmers, it will be politically easier for them to deliver some reform in agriculture (a) 
the more developed countries reform their farm policies and thereby raise the mean 
                                                 
26 For recent reviews of the substantial contribution that a further boost to agricultural research could 
do for poverty alleviation in low-income countries, see Hazell and Haddad (2001) and Ryan (2002). 
27 If such subsidies are only paid in the towns and cities, however, this increases the risk of excessive, 
socially costly migration out of agriculture as analysed by Harris and Todaro (1970).  32
and reduce the variance of international food prices and, if necessary, (b) mechanisms 
are introduced to increase perceived food security.   33
References 
 
Anderson, K. (1992), ‘International Dimensions of the Political Economy of 
Distortionary Price and Trade Policies,’ Ch. 13 in Open Economies: 
Structural Adjustment and Agriculture, edited by I. Goldin and L.A. Winters, 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Anderson, K. (1994), ‘Food Price Policy in East Asia’, Asian-Pacific Economic 
Literature 8(2): 15-30, November. 
Anderson, K. (1995), 'Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and 
Poor Countries', Economic Development and Cultural Change 43(2): 401-23, 
January. 
Anderson, K. (2000), ‘Agriculture’s Multifunctionality and the WTO’, Australian 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 44(3): 475-94, September. 
Anderson, K. (2002), ‘Economy-wide Dimensions of Trade Policy Reform’, Ch. 2 in 
Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook, edited by B. Hoekman, A. 
Matoo and P. English, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Anderson, K. (2003), ‘Agriculture, Developing Countries, and the WTO Millennium 
Round’, Ch. 1 in Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda From a 
Development Perspective, edited by M.D. Ingco and L.A. Winters, Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming). 
Anderson, K., B. Dimaranan, T. Hertel and W. Martin (1997a), ‘Asia-Pacific Food 
Markets and Trade in 2005: A Global, Economy-Wide Perspective’, 
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 41(1): 19-44. 
Anderson, K., B. Dimaranan, T. Hertel and W. Martin (1997b), ‘Economic Growth 
and Policy Reforms in the APEC Region: Trade and Welfare Implications by 
2005’, Asia-Pacific Economic Review 3(1): 1-18, April. 
Anderson, K., B. Dimaranan, J. Francois, T. Hertel, B. Hoekman and W. Martin 
(2001), ‘The Cost of Rich (and Poor) Country Protection to Developing 
Countries’, Journal of African Economies 10(3): 227-57. 
Anderson, K., E. Ianchovichina and J. Huang (2002), ‘ Impact of China’s WTO 
Accession on Rural-Urban Income Inequality and Poverty’, paper for the 
World Bank project on WTO Accession, Policy Reform and Poverty 
Reduction in China, World Bank, Washington, D.C., June.  
Anderson, K., Y. Hayami and Others (1986), The Political Economy of Agricultural 
Protection, Boston, London and Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
Anderson, K. and B. Hoekman (2000), “Developing Country Agriculture and the New 
Trade Agenda”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(1): 171-80, 
October. 
Anderson, K. and A. Strutt (1999), 'Impact of East Asia’s Growth Interruption and 
Policy Responses: The Case of Indonesia', Asian Economic Journal 13(2): 
205-18, June. 
Anderson, K. and R. Tyers (1993), 'More on Welfare Gains to Developing Countries 
from Liberalising World Food Trade', Journal of Agricultural Economics 
44(2): 189-204, May. 
Anderson, K. and S. Yao (2003), ‘How Can South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa Gain 
From the Next WTO Round?’ Journal of Economic Integration 18(3), 
September (forthcoming). 
Anderson, K. and S. Yao (2004), “China, GMOs and World Trade in Agricultural and 
Textile Products”, Pacific Economic Review (forthcoming). 
Baker,D. (2003), ‘Agriculture in the EU’s Eastern Enlargement: The Current Status 
for CEECs’, Intereconomics 38(1): 19-28, January/February.   34
Beghin, J.C., D. Roland-Holst and D. van der Mensbrugghe (2003), ‘ How Will 
Agricultural Trade reforms in High-income Countries Affect the Tradeing 
Relationships of developing Countries?’ pp. 39-58 in OECD (2003).  
Berg, A. and A.O. Krueger (2002), ‘Trade, Growth and Poverty’, paper presented at 
the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 
Washington, D.C. 
Bjornskov, C. and K.M. Lind (2002), ‘Where do Developing Countries Go After 
Doha? An Analysis of WTO Positions and Potential Alliances’, Journal of 
World Trade 36(3): 543-62. 
Borrell, B. (1999a), ‘Bananas: Straightening Out Bent Ideas on Trade as Aid’, Paper 
presented at the World Bank/WTO Conference on Agriculture and the New 
Trade Agenda from a Development Perspective, Geneva, 1-2 October.  
Borrell, B. (1999b), ‘Sugar: The Taste Test of Trade Liberalization’, Paper presented 
at the World Bank/WTO Conference on Agriculture and the New Trade 
Agenda from a Development Perspective, Geneva, 1-2 October.  
Bouguignon. F. and C. Morrisson (2002), ‘Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-
1992’, American Economic Review 92(4): 727-44, September. 
Brown, L.R. (1995), Who Will Feed China? Wake-up Call for a Small Planet, 
Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute. 
Cairns Group (2002), ‘Negotiating Proposal on Market Access’, submission to the 
Committee on Agriculture Special Session, JOB(02)/1126, WTO, Geneva, 
September. 
Chen, S. and M. Ravallion (2001), ‘How Did the World’s Poorest Fare in the 1990s?’ 
mimeo, Development Research Group, World Bank. Washington, D.C. 
Chen, S. and M. Ravallion (2002), ‘Household Welfare Impacts of China’s Accession 
to the WTO’, paper for the World Bank project on WTO Accession, Policy 
Reform and Poverty Reduction in China, World Bank, Washington, D.C., Oct. 
Collier, P. and D. Dollar (2002), Globalization, Growth, and Poverty, New York: 
Oxford University Press for the World Bank. 
Diao, X, A. Somwaru and T. Roe (2001), ‘A Global Analysis of Agricultural Reform 
in WTO Member Countries’, Background paper for a USDA project on 
Agricultural Policy Reform in the WTO: The Road Ahead, ERS-E01-001, 
Washington, D.C.: US Department of Agriculture. 
Diaz-Bonilla, E., M. Thomas and S. Robinson (2003), ‘Trade, Food Security and 
WTO Negotiations: Some Reflections on Boxes and their Content’, pp. 59-
104 in OECD (2003). 
Dimaranan, B. T. Hertel and R. Keeney (2003), ‘OECD Domestic Support and the 
Developing Countries’, paper for the UNU/WIDER project on the impact of 
WTO on low-income countries, GTAP Center, Purdue University, January. 
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2002), ‘Growth is Good for the Poor’, Journal of Economic 
Growth (forthcoming). 
Findlay, C.C. and A. Warren (eds.) (2000), Impediments to Trade in Services: 
Measurement and Policy Implications, London: Routledge. 
FOI (2003), ‘Note on the Harbinson Draft on Modalities in the WTO Agriculture 
Negotiations’, mimeo, Danish Research Institute of Food Economics, 
Copenhagen, 11 March. 
Francois, J, (2001), The Next WTO Round: North-South Stakes in New Market Access 
Negotiations, Adelaide: Centre for International Economic Studies and 
Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. 
Francois, J.F. and W. Martin (2003), ‘Formula Approaches for Market Access 
Negotiations’, The World Economy 26(1): 1-28, January.  35
Francois, J. and A. Strutt (1999), ‘Post-Uruguay Round Tariff Vectors for GTAP 
Version 4’, mimeo, Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 
Francois, J.F. and I. Wooten (2000), ‘Trade in International Transport Services: The 
Role of Competition’, Review of International Economics 9(2), May.   
Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman (1995), ‘Trade Wars and Trade Talks’, Journal of 
Political Economy 103(4):675-708, August. 
Hagen, R.J., O. Maestad and A. Michelsen (2001), ‘Economic Impact on the Least 
Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on Their Products’, 
Bergen: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, May. 
Harris, J.R. and M.P. Todaro (12970), ‘Migration, Unemployment and Development: 
A Two-Sector Analysis’, American Economic Review 60(1): 126-42, March. 
Harrison, W. J. and K. R. Pearson (1996), ‘Computing Solutions for Large General 
Equilibrium Models Using GEMPACK’, Computational Economics 9: 83-172. 
Hazell, P. and L. Haddad (2001), ‘Agricultural Research and Poverty Reduction’, 
IFPRI Discussion Paper 34, Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy 
Research Institute, August. 
Hensen, H.T., S. Robinson and F. Tarp (2002), ‘General Equilibrium Measures of 
Agricultural Policy Bias in Fifteen Developing Countries’, TMD Discussion 
Paper No. 105, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, 
October. 
Hertel, T.W. (ed.) 1997. Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications, 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hertel, T., K. Anderson, J. Francois, B. Hoekman and W. Martin (1999), ‘Agriculture 
and Non-agricultural Liberalization in the Millennium Round’, Paper for the 
World Bank/WTO Conference on Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda 
from a Development Perspective, Geneva, 1-2 October.  
Hillman, A.L. and P. Moser (1995), ‘Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal 
Exchange of Market Access’, in The New Transatlantic Economy, edited by 
M. Canzoneri et al., Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoekman, B. (1996), ‘Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services’, Ch. 4 
in The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries, edited by W. Martin 
and L.A. Winters, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoekman, B., C. Michalopoulos, M. Schiff and D. Tarr (2001), ‘Trade Policy Reform 
and Poverty Alleviation’, World Bank Trade Working Paper # 2773, 
Washington, D.C., December. 
Hoekman, B., F. Ng and M. Olarreaga (2002a), ‘Eliminating Excess Tariffs on 
Exports of Least Developed Countries’, World Bank Economic Review 16: 1-
21, January. 
Hoekman, B., F. Ng and M. Olarreaga (2002b), ‘Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus 
Domestic Support: What’s More Important for Developing Countries?’, 
mimeo, World Bank, Washington DC, September. 
Ianchovichina, E., A. Mattoo and M. Olarreaga (2001), ‘Unrestricted Market Access 
for Sub-Saharan Africa: How Much is it Worth and Who Pays? CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 2820, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
June.  
Isaac, G.E. and W.A. Kerr (2003), “Genetically Modified Organisms and Trade 
Rules: Identifying Important Challenges for the WTO”, The World Economy 
26 (1): 29-43. 
Legg, W. (2003), ‘Agricultural Subsidies: Measurement and Use in Policy 
Evaluation’, Presidential Address to the Agricultural Economics Society, 
University of Plymouth, 12 April.  36
Lindert, P.H. (1991), ‘Historical Patterns of Agricultural Policy’, in Agriculture and 
the State: Growth, Employment and Poverty, edited by C.P. Timmer, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Martin, W. (2001), ‘Trade Policies, Developing Countries, and Globalization’, in 
Globalization, Policy Research Report, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.  
Martin, W. and D. Mitra (2001), ‘Productivity Growth in Agriculture and 
Manufacturing’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(2): 403-23, 
January. 
Martin, W. and L.A. Winters (eds.) (1996), The Uruguay Round and the Developing 
Countries, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Maskus, K. (2003), ‘Observations on the Development Potential of Geographical 
Indications’, background paper prepared for the 2
nd meeting of the Task Force 
on Trade and Finance of the UN Millennium Development Goals Project, Yale 
University, New Haven, 1-3 April. 
Mathews, A. (2002), ‘Developing Country Experience With the Implementation of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: Synthesis of the Findings of 
23 Country Case Studies’, FAO Geneva Symposium on Implementing the 
WTO’s URAA, 2 October.  
McCulloch, N., L.A. Winters and X. Cirera (2001), Trade Liberalization and Poverty: 
A Handbook, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
McDougall, R.A., A. Elbehri and T.P. Truong (1998) (eds.) Global Trade, Assistance, 
and Protection: The GTAP 4 Data Base. Center for Global Trade Analysis, 
Purdue University, West Lafayette. 
Nielsen, C. and K. Anderson (2001), ‘Global Market Effects of European Responses 
to Genetically Modified Organisms’, Weltwertschaftliches Archiv 137(2): 320-
46, June. 
OECD (2002), Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation, 
Paris: OECD (annual publication, with a CD-ROM containing PSE/CSE time 
series estimates since 1986). 
OECD (2003), Agricultural Trade and Poverty: Making Policy Analysis Count, Paris: 
OECD. 
Orden, D. (2003), ‘U.S. Agricultural Policy: The 2002 Farm Bill and the WTO Doha 
Round Proposal’, TMD Discussion Paper No. 109, International Food Policy 
Research Institute, Washington DC, February. 
Otsuka, K. (2002), ‘Poverty Reduction Issues: Village Economy Perspective’, Asian 
Development Review 19(1): 98-116. 
Oxfam (2002), ‘Boxing Match in Agricultural Trade: Will WTO Negotiations Knock 
Out the World’s Poorest Farmers?’, Briefing Paper 32, Brussels: Oxfam 
International. 
Paarlberg, P.L., M. Bredahl and J.G. Lee (2002), ‘Multifunctionality and Agricultural 
Trade Negotiations’, Review of Agricultural Economics 24(2): 322-35, Fall.  
Ryan, J. (2002), ‘Agricultural Research and Poverty Alleviation: Some International 
Perspectives’, paper presented to the John Dillon Commemorative 
Conference, University of New England, Armidale, 20 September. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. (2002), ‘The World Distribution of Income (Estimated from 
Individual Country Distributions)’, NBER Working Paper 8933, Cambridge 
MA, May. 
Sharma, R. (2003), ‘The Transmission of World Price Signals: The Concept, Issues, 
and Some Evidence from Asian Cereal Markets’, pp. 141-60 in OECD (2003). 
Tangermann, S. and T. Josling (1999), ‘The Interests of Developing Countries in the 
Next Round of WTO Agricultural Negotiations’, paper presented at the 
UNCTAD workshop on Developing a Proactive and Coherent Agenda for  37
African Countries in Support of their participation in International Trade 
Negotiations, Pretoria, 29 June to 2 July. 
Tyers, R. and K. Anderson (1992), Disarray in World Food Markets: A Quantitative 
Assessment, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001), Duty and Quota Free Market Access 
for LDCs: An Analysis of Quad Initiatives, Geneva: UNCTAD and London: 
Commonwealth Secretariat. 
Walmsley, T. and L.A. Winters (2002), ‘Relaxing Restrictions on Temporary 
Movement of Natural Persons: A Simulation Analysis’, mimeo, University of 
Sussex. 
Wilson, J.S. (2002), ‘Standards, Trade and Development: What is Known and What 
do we Need to Know?’ Paper presented at the Roundtable on Informing the 
Doha Process: New Research for Developing Countries, Cairo, 20-21 May. 
Winters, L.A. (2000), 'Trade, Trade Policy and Poverty: What Are the Links?' 
Background paper for the World Bank's World Development Report 2000/01, 
January. 
Winters, L.A. (2002), ‘Trade Liberalisation and Poverty: What Are the Links?’ The 
World Economy 25(9): 1339-68, September. 
Winters, L.A., N. McCulloch and A, McKay (2002), ‘Trade Liberalization and 
Poverty: The Empirical Evidence’, mimeo, University of Sussex, September. 
World Bank (2002), Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries: 
Making World Trade for the World’s Poor, Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. 
WTO (2001a), Market Access: Unfinished Business: Post-Uruguay Round Inventory 
and Issues, Special Study No. 6, Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
WTO (2001b), Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, Geneva: World Trade Organization, 14 November. 
WTO (2001c), Extension of the Protection of Geographical Indications for Wines and 
Spirits to GIs for All Products: Potential Costs and Implications, IP/C/W/289, 
Geneva: World Trade Organization, 29 June. 
WTO (2003), Negotiations On Agriculture: First Draft Of Modalities For The 
Further Commitments (Revision), TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, Geneva: World Trade 
Organization, 18 March. Table 1: Sectoral and regional contributions to economic welfare gains
a from 
completely removing trade barriers globally, post-Uruguay Round, 2005 
 
(a) in 1995 US$ billions 
 







and Food Primary  Clothing Manufactures  
High Income      
   High Income 110.5 -0.0 -5.7  -8.1 96.6 
 Low Income  11.6 0.1 9.0  22.3 43.1 
 Total  122.1 0.0 3.3  14.2 139.7 
Low Income      
 High Income 11.2 0.2 10.5  27.7 49.6 
 Low Income  31.4 2.5 3.6  27.6 65.1 
 Total  42.6 2.7 14.1  55.3 114.7 
All Countries      
 High Income 121.7 0.1 4.8  19.6 146.2 
 Low Income  43.0 2.7 12.6  49.9 108.1 
 Total  164.7 2.8 17.4  69.5 254.3 
 
(b) in per cent of total global gains 
 
Liberalizing   Agriculture Other Textiles  &  Other Total 
Region:  Benefiting 
region 
and Food Primary  Clothing Manufactures  
High Income      
   High Income 43.4 0.0 -2.3  -3.2 38.0 
 Low Income  4.6 0.1 3.5  8.8 16.9 
 Total  48.0 0.0 1.3  5.6 54.9 
Low Income      
 High Income 4.4 0.1 4.1  10.9 19.5 
 Low Income  12.3 1.0 1.4  10.9 25.6 
 Total  16.7 1.1 5.5  21.7 45.1 
All Countries      
 High Income 47.9 0.1 1.9  7.7 57.5 
 Low Income  16.9 1.0 4.9  19.6 42.5 
 Total  64.8 1.1 6.8  27.3 100.0 
 
a No account is taken in these calculations of the welfare effects of environmental changes 
associated with trade liberalization, which could be positive or negative depending in part on 
how environmental policies are adjusted following trade reforms.  
 
b High and low income here are short-hand for developed and developing countries. 
 
Source: Anderson et al. (2001). Table 2: Disaggregation of sectoral and regional contributions to economic welfare gains
a from completely removing trade barriers 
globally, post-Uruguay Round, 2005 
(1995 US$billion) 
  Rich country liberalization  Developing country liberalization  Global liberalization 
 Total  Primary  Manuf. Total  Primary  Manuf.  All  merchandise 
 $bil $bil $bil $bil  $bil $bil  $bil % of GDP
North America  3 11 -9 19  9 11  22 0.2
Western Europe  50 61 -11 21  2 19  71 0.7
Australia/New Zealand  8 8 -1 2  1 1  10 2
Japan 36 30 6 8  0 8  44 0.8
China 5 -5 10 -11  -4 -7  -6 -0.4
HKong, Korea, Taiwán  4 1 6 24  12 12  28 2.3
Indonesia 1 0 0 1  0 1  2 0.9
Other Southeast Asia  0 -1 1 10  6 5  11 2.6
India 4 1 3 5  2 3  9 1.8
Other South Asia  1 0 1 5  3 2  7 4.6
Brazil 3 1 2 13  5 9  16 2
Other Latin America  15 14 1 4  3 2  19 2.4
Turkey 0 -1 1 2  1 1  2 0.9
Middle East & N. Africa  -1 -3 2 -1  0 0  -2 -0.2
Economies in Transition  4 1 3 2  2 0  6 0.7
South African CU  1 1 0 1  0 0  1 0.9
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  2 2 0 1  1 0  3 1.4
Rest of world  4 3 1 7  3 4  11 3
Low income  43 12 31 65  34 31 108 1.9
High income  97 110 -14 50 11 38 146 0.6
Total 140 122 17 115  45 69  254 0.8
 
Source: Anderson et al. (2001). Table 3: Percentage difference in sectoral output when all merchandise trade 
distortions remaining post-Uruguay Round are removed, 2005 













W h e a t  1 8266
OtherCerealGrain 114 85 1 1
V e g F r u i t N u t s  1011
OilSeeds 2 3 -1 2
OthCrops 43 -8 -2 1
PlantFibre -12 11 -2 0
Livestocks 28 15 0 1
OthFoodProd 28 2 -2 29
MeatDairyPrd 38 14 1 3
F o r e s t r y F i s h  2001
E n e r g M i n e r a l  - 2012
VegOilsFats 0 0 -4 -5
TextileWap -8 -2 -10 -16
OtherManuf -7 0 3 11
S e r v i c e s  0000
 












Wheat -3 -6 15 7
OtherCerealGrain 171 90 1 2
VegFruitNuts 1 9 0 -3
OilSeeds -5 -1 0 7
OthCrops 61 9 -2 -4
P l a n t F i b r e  - 1 0- 1- 2- 1
Livestocks -6 54 0 6
OthFoodProd 22 3 1 38
M e a t D a i r y P r d  - 6028
F o r e s t r y F i s h  7403
E n e r g M i n e r a l  2 9763
VegOilsFats 0 2 -15 -17
TextileWap 1 -13 5 29
OtherManuf -8 -5 19 60
S e r v i c e s  1024
 
Source: Anderson and Yao (2003).  3
Table 4: Income category and food trade status of a sample of developing countries. 
 
 





Income/food trade  
status groupings 
     Food 
imports 










Bangladesh 35  LI LDC  LIFDC  21  829 
Botswana 25  UMI   NFIDC   14  256 
Brazil 10  UMI     7  30 
Costa Rica  5  UMI     6  19 
Côte d’Ivoire  15  LI   NFIDC LIFDC  9  17 
Egypt 4  LMI   NFIDC LIFDC  20  542 
Fiji na  LMI     9  52 
Guyana na  LMI     7  23 
Honduras 21  LMI   NFIDC LIFDC  13  48 
India 24  LI   LIFDC  5  42 
Indonesia 6  LI  LIFDC  6  56 
Jamaica 9  LMI   NFIDC   12  111 
Kenya 44  LI   NFIDC LIFDC  13  32 
Malawi 33  LI LDC  LIFDC  13  16 
Morocco 7  LMI   NFIDC LIFDC  12  146 
Pakistan 19  LI   NFIDC LIFDC  15  134 
Peru 11  LMI   NFIDC   14  152 
Philippines 23  LMI   LIFDC  6  123 
Senegal 25  LI LDC  LIFDC  26  357 
Sri Lanka  23  LMI   NFIDC LIFDC  12  68 
Thailand 18  LMI     2  14 
Uganda 21  LI LDC  LIFDC  20  41 
Zimbabwe 38 LI     5  13 
 
Note: LI, LMI and UMI refer to the World Bank classifications of low-income, lower 
middle-income and upper middle-income countries; LDCs are least-developed 
countries, as recognized by the UN; LIFDCs are low-income food-deficit countries, 
defined by FAO as those countries with a GNP per capita less than $1,445 in 2000 
and which are net importers of food defined on a calorie basis; NFIDCs are net food-
importing developing countries, as defined by the WTO Committee on Agriculture. 
 
Source: Compiled from data in Mathews (2002) and the FAO’s State of Food 
Insecurity 2002, Rome.  4
Table 5: Changes in China’s real factor prices and national economic welfare 
due to its WTO accession, 2001 to 2007 
 




Factor rewards:   
Alternative scenario: core 
case plus also removing 
labour market distortion
 
Farm unskilled wages  -0.7  16.8 
Rental price of land  -5.5  -9.7 
Nonfarm unskilled wages  1.2  -3.8 
Skilled labor wages  0.8  -1.7 
Rental price of capital  1.3  -1.4 
 
Farm household income
a:    
Farm household type-A  -1.6  6.8 
Farm household type-B  -0.8  3.6 
Farm household type-C  0.1  0.4 
 
a Farm income from agriculture is made up of 57 per cent from unskilled farm labour, 
26 per cent from agricultural land and 17 per cent from farm capital, according to the 
GTAP database. In 1999 on average 51 per cent of rural household income in China 
was earned outside agriculture, mostly from unskilled labour. Therefore, to illustrate 
the importance of those off-farm earnings for farm families, three types of farm 
households are shown in this table: it is assumed nonfarm unskilled labour contributes 
0 per cent of total farm household income for type A, 30 per cent for type B, and 60 
per cent for type C.  
 
Source: Anderson, Ianchovichina and Huang (2002). Figure 1:  Agricultural producer support estimate by country 































Countries are ranked according to 1999-2001 levels. 
1. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic 1986-88 is replaced by 
1991-93. 
2. For 1986-88, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic are excluded. 
 
Source: Legg (2003), based on OECD (2002). Figure 2: Composition of agricultural producer support estimate by country 





























Payments based on input constraints, overall farm income and miscellaneous payments
  Payments based on historical entitlements
  Payments based on area planted/animal numbers
Market Price Support, payments based on output, payments based on input use
 
Notes: Countries are ranked according to the 1999-2001 share of market price support, 
payments based on output and payments based on input use in the PSE. 
1. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic 1986-88 is replaced by 
1991-93. 
2. For 1986-88, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic are excluded. 
 
Source: Legg (2003), based on OECD (2002).CIES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
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